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The Financing of Industry in the Netherlands - Some Bottlenecks; by 
Hans Visser, Hans Eijgenhuijsen and Jaap Koelewijn. 
Summary 
The investment ratio in the Netherlands feil sharply in the wake of 
the two oil crises in the 1970s and only picks up hesitatingly in 
the mid-1980s. Apart from caution on the side of businessmen, 
bottlenecks in the financial system seem to slow down the recovery. 
First of all, businessmen seem to prefer to improve equity/debt 
ratios out of retained earnings before embarking on new investment. 
A more structural problem is that especially small businesses are 
hard put to attract equity capital. Changes in the allocation of 
household savings do nothing to alleviate this problem. A case can 
be made for a change in investment behaviour not only on the part 
of institutional investors, but on the part of commercial banks as 
we 11. 
Investments, savings, and the financial system 
Net investments in the Netherlands, expressed as a percentage of 
nationale income, have about halved after the two oil crises that 
marked the decade of the 1970s. This holds true both for investment 
by business firms and, though to a lesser extent, investment by the 
central government. It is not really surprising that the demand for 
investment goods plummeted. First of all, business profits had to 
bear the brunt of the worsening terms of trade resulting from more 
expensive energy imports after the 1973~ '74 oil crisis. Real wages 
rosé even much more than labour productivity in 197^ and 19751). 
After the second oil crisis governments in large parts of the world 
resorted to restrictive macro-economie policies in order to combat 
inflation. This was no great help for world trade. So profits were 
squeezed out by rising costs on one side and slackening demand on 
the other. In the mid-1980s prospects for business look more 
propitious, but so far the investment ratio shows little sign of 
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returning to the level of one decade ago, let alohe the level 
reached in the mid-1960s. It must be admitted, though, that a 
return to the last-mentioned level does not seem necessary for 
sustained growth. Investment includes investment in dwellings. Now 
that the market for dwellings is showing signs of saturation, 
investments in home construction seem set to remain at a struetu-
rally lower level2). 
It stands to reason that companies first wish to improve their 
capital ratios (i.e., the ratio of own 'funds to assets) before 
embarking on large-scale new investment projects. Equally under-
standably, commercial banks are licking their wounds after an 
uncommonly high number of business failures has reduced their 
reserves. If anything, they still err on the safe side in their 
credit activities. Presumably all this will pass with time. There 
may, however, be a more structural danger lurking behind the 
corner, se. a laek of equity capital, especially for smaller firms. 
If there is a lack of equity capital, that can only mean that 
there are bottlenecks in the finaneial system. In a closed economy, 
there can only be an overall shortage of savings if all the factors 
of production are in use and desired investment meets with capacity 
problems. In an open economy, foreign savings in the form of 
capital imports can alleviate or solve the problem. TabIe 1 shows 
that the Netherlands have been running a huge and increasing 
current account surplus, i.e. a surplus of savings over investment, 
in recent years. Savings therefore exceed investments by a 
considerable margin. There seems to be a problem of allocation: not 
enough savings are offered in the form of equity capital. 
The need for own capital 
A couple of attempts have recently been made to estimate the amount 
of equity capital needed for reasonable economie growth. They start 
from the observation that equity/debt ratios have quite dramatical-
ly deteriorated since the golden years of the 1960s. For companies 
whose shares are traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the ratio 
Table 1. Savings and investments in the Netherlands, 1965 - 1984, in percentages of nati 
1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 
Savings 19.6 19.6 15.3 14.8 13.4 12.3 
of which 
government 
households 
business firms 
Net investments 
of which 
government 
business firms (fixed investment) 
inventories 
National savings surplus = surplus on the 
current account of the balance of payments .2 -1.5 2.6 .8 - .9 -1.2 
4.1 4.1 2.0 1.9 .7 .2 
10.9 9.7 10.5 9.0 9.1 8.8 
4.6 5.8 2.8 4 .0 3.5 3.3 
19.4 21.1 12.7 14.0 14.2 13.5 
4 .3 4.4 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.7 
13.0 14.6 9.7 10.4 10.8 10.3 
2.1 2.2 - .5 .6 .7 .5 
Source: National Account Statistics 1983 and 1984, Central Bureau of Statistics, The Hag 
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of own funds to borrowed funds was 32:68 in 1981 as against 44:56 
in 1970 and 54:46 in 1965. Thanks to retained earnings, made 
possible by higher profits, the ratio improved to 34:66 in 1982 and 
1983 and to 37:63 in 19843). Most commentators agree that the 
deterioration up ti'11 1981 was due to two sets of factors. The 
first one is that companies increasingly had to resort to borrowing 
because low profitability made stock issues unattractive to inves-
tors and precluded any large-scale retaining of earnings. The other 
one is that borrowing was made attractive for tax reasons, whilst 
the low real rate of interest made leverage even more attractive. 
The day of reckoning came with the slump following the second oil 
crisis, coupled with extremely high interest rates which even led 
to negative leverage effect for a number of firms1*),, 
One estimate of the volume of available own funds has been made 
by the Raad van Centrale Ondernemersorganisaties (RCO; Council of 
Central Entrepreneurs' Organisations). Drawing on calculations made 
by NMB bank, the RCO finds that own funds amounted to roughly 
Dfl. 90 billion in 19805). This would be equivalent to some 
Dfl. 120 billion in 1984, given the increase in capital per worker 
that has taken place over this four-year periode. A higher esti-
mate, of Dfl. 183 billion in 1983» has been made by Stichting 
Maatschappij en Onderneming (SMO; Foundation Society and Business 
Firm), drawing on data and estimates which have been published by 
the Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER; Social-Economic Council)6). 
One cause of the discrepancy between the two estimates may be that 
the RCO/NMB data neglect firms without bank loans. Besides, the 
method of valuation is not made explicit. Both investigations leave 
the agrarian sector and the banks out of account. 
According to Rabobank (the cooperative banking organisation, 
with a very strong foothold in the agrarian sector) agrarian firms 
have more than Dfl. 80 billion own capital out of a total capital 
amounting to some Dfl. 120 billion7). Published own funds of the 
banking sector (including savings banks and mortgage banks and 
excluding subordinated debt) amounted to somewhat over Dfl. 20 
billion at the end of 19848). including unincorporated business, 
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our own (admittedly extremely rough) estimate of total own funds in 
business firms works out at some Dfl. 190 to Dfl. 200 billion 
excluding agriculture and the banking sector, or Dfl. 290 to 
Dfl. 300 billion including these sectors. These figures are based 
on published balance sheets. The market value may work out at a 
higher figure. 
One may now ask what would be a desirable level of own funds. 
There is not one unique capital ratio that can be taken as the 
norm. Rather, there is a range of ratios that can all be accept-
able to a greater or lesser degree. The equity/debt ratio found for 
the mid-1960s can be safely taken as the upper limit of such a 
range. Assuming that the above-mentioned ratio of 54:46 can be 
taken as the average for all business firms outside agriculture and 
banking in 1965, a return to this ratio would require an additional 
amount of [(54 - 37)/37] x Dfl. 190 to Dfl. 200 billion or some 
Dfl. 90 billion in the form of own funds. This is quite a formida-
ble amount, which, moreover, does not include the sums that might 
be needed to improve equity/debt ratios in banking and agricul-
ture. Given the Rabobank figures mentioned above, we can safely 
pass over the agrarian sector. As for the banking sector, NMB bank 
representatives argue that a doubling of the capital ratio is 
called for. Recent developments in the EC as to banking supervision 
also point in the direction of higher capital ratios (and a reduced 
role of subordinated loans). A doubling of (published) own funds in 
the banking sector would add Dfl. 20 billion to our estimate of 
Dfl. 90 billion. So Dfl. 110 billion can be taken as the upper 
limit of any estimate of the backlog of own funds. 
Now for the lower limit. There does not seem to be any objec-
tively safe minimum capital ratio. Research performed by the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS; Central Bureau of 
Statistics) and the Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO; 
Association of Dutch Business Firms, the bigger of the two 
employers' organisations) shows that about 1/3 of the business 
firms have a capital ratio below 20%. Let us, somewhat arbitrarily, 
take 20% as the acceptable minimum. According to our own calcula-
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tions, some Dfl. 10 billion would be needed to make up the 
defieiency. Add to this the Dfl. 20 billion needed for the banking 
sector and we end up with a backlog, at 1984 figures, of anything 
between Dfl. 30 billion and Dfl. 110 billion, or between 8.5 and 
31? of national income. 
Apart from a backlog, a stock demand, there is a recurrent flow 
demand for own funds, resulting from net investment implied in real 
economie growth and from inflation. Let us assume that a 
satisfactory rate of growth would require a net investment ratio 
simular to the 1965 one, i.e. about 15?. Expecting a slight further 
fall in the investment in dwellings as a percentage of national 
income,9) and assuming that investment in inventories need not 
exceed 1% of national income, a net investment ratio of about 13% 
would be sufficiënt. National income was Dfl. 353 billion in 1984, 
but would have been higher if investment had in fact reached the 
13? level. Let us somewhat arbitrarily assume that it would have 
reached Dfl. 390 billion, of which 13? or Dfl. 50.7 billion would 
have been investments by business firms. At the 1965 equity/debt 
ratio this would mean a demand for Dfl. 27.4 billion of own funds. 
This should, as indicated above, be taken as an upper limit. 
Where do own funds come from? 
It has been argued above that an overall shortage of savings can 
hardly be a serious problem, other than in a closed economy with 
capacity constraints. In the Netherlands, with its well-developed 
financial system, a shortage of credit is no real problem either. 
However, concern has been expressed as to the possible insuffi-
ciency of available own funds1^). 
At the upper limit of 54? own funds, net business investments to 
the amount of 13% of national income would require own funds to the 
amount of some 7? of national income. If retained earnings (i.e., 
savings, vide Table 1 ) can be kept at the historically not unduly 
high level of about 5% of national income, that would leave 2% to 
come from outside sources. Apparently such percentages were 
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easily made available during the 1960s. Is there any reason to 
doubt that they can be made available now? We think so. Ignoring 
international capital flows for the moment, own funds apart from 
retained earnings have to be provided out of household savings, 
either directly or via financial institutions. Over the last two 
decades, household savings haven become more and more of a 
contractual nature (cf. TabIe 2). The share of pension funds and 
life assurance companies in household savings nas quite dramatical-
ly increased. It is 'free' household savings that are the potential 
souree of own funds. This is because pension funds and life 
assurance companies are traditionaly averse to providing risk 
capital, whilst, moreover, shareholding by banks is negligible. One 
may wonder if Dutch institutional investors are not overly cautious 
in this respect. It has been estimated that British pension funds 
in the years from 1976 through 1980 invested between 37% and 50% of 
their net increase in available funds in company ordinary 
shares11). In the U.S.A., 60% of the funds of private pension 
funds is invested in company shares1'?). This is in marked 
contrast to the allocation of investments by Dutch institutional 
investors. The figures given in Table 3 give a wrong impression of 
their investments in.company shares. Most, if not all of the total 
increase of Dfl. 7459 million between 1982 and 1985 must have been 
caused by a rise in share prices13). But even if the total amount 
would have represented new net investments, this would come down to 
a measly Dfl. 2.5 billion a year, or much less than 1 per cent of 
national income. All this means that in the situation as per the 
end of 1984, just enough own funds could be made available from 
domestic sources to finance a satisfactory 13% investment ratio if 
households would invest the best part of their free savings in 
company shares, which they will not do in the best of times. We may 
note in passing that the plight of companies was relieved by 
government subsidies, investment grants and tax facilities amoun-
ting to some Dfl. 10 billion or 2.8% of national income11*). n is 
to be expected that these amounts will be considerably reduced in 
the future. 
Table 2. The distribution of household savings, 1965 - 1984, in percentages of national i 
unless otherwise indicated. 
1965 1970 1975 1977 1978 1979 
Household savings 
of which via life assurance companies 
via pension funds 
total contractual savings 
'free' savings 
(idem, as a percentage of household 
savings 
Interest earnings of life assurance 
companies and pension funds 
(idem, as a percentage of contractual 
savings 
(idem, as a percentage of household 
savings 
10.9 9.7 10.5 9.0 9.1 
1.5 1.3 2.4 1.5 1.5 
3.0 3.9 5.3 5.3 5.5 
4.5 5.2 
6.4 4.4 
7.7 
2.8 
6.7 7.1 
2.2 2.1 
8.8 
1.6 
5.8 
7.4 
1.4 
58.7 45.9 26.5 24.7 22.7 16.2 
2.3 2.9 4.1 4.5 4.7 5.1 
51.1 55.5 53.2 66.8 66.5 69.2 7 
21.1 30.0 39.1 50.3 51.4 58.0 6 
Source: National Account Statistics and Statistiek sociale verzekeringen, pensioenverzeke 
tics of Social Security, Pensions and Life Assurance), Central Bureau of Statisti 
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Table 3. Investments of institutional investors in company shares, 1960 -
1985, in Dfl. million and in percentages of their balance sheet totals, 
private pension 
fumds 
state pension 
fund 
life assurance com-
panies and mutual 
savings associations 
1960 
amount 288 
share 5. ,6 
domestic 5.6 
foreign .0 
1970 
amount 2050 
share 11. .4 
domestic 6.3 
foreign 5.0 
1982 
amount 4981 
share 4. ,8 
domestic 2.5 
foreign 2.3 
1985 
amount 9994 
share 7, .3 
domestic 4.6 
foreign 2.7 
23 
.6 
.0 
85 
725 
.8 
.0 
1585 
1.3 
1.3 
.0 
276 
3.4 
3.3 
.1 
1100 
5.8 
.5 4.6 
.0 1.2 
2783 
4.0 
3.6 
.4 
4369 
4.9 
4.3 
.6 
Source: quarterly and annual reports, The Netherlands Bank, Statistical Appendix 
Table 2.2, various issues. 
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If we relax the 5*1% own funds norm, the situation looks muoh 
less bleak. At say two-thirds of this norm, or a 3è% capital 
ratio, 13%" net investment requires no more than k.7% of national 
income in the form of own funds. Companies can provide this them-
selves and any additional amounts could be used to reduce backlogs 
(This ignores variations in retained earnings between firms. 
Undercapitalised firms with insufficiënt retained earnings would 
still have to resort to new stook issues in order to finance new 
investments unless they are taken over by financially stronger 
firms). Note that in our calculations we have neglected the pheno-
menon of inflation. With inflation, some additions to own funds are 
needed to hold the capital ratio constant, especially in the case 
of banks, which have few assets that provide a more or less 
automatic hedge against inflation. 
Let us now introducé international capital flows. In 1984, Dutch 
residents sold domestic equity abroad to the amount of Dfl. 37.5 
billion and bought back for Dfl. 35 billion. The corresponding 
figures for foreign equity were Dfl. 33 billion and Dfl. 36 billion 
respectively^S). Total sales and purchases roughly equalled, but 
the four separate items all amounted to some 10% of national 
income. Even quite minor redirections of these flows would suffice 
to make a few additional percentage points of national income 
available for investment in company shares. 
Prospects and policy options 
The upshot of our back-of-an-envelope calculations is that, tak ing 
an overall view of the need for own funds, there do not seem to be 
any serious problems if an (average) capital ratio below 40%, 
rather than over 50%, is deemed sufficiënt. In that case the demand 
backlog could be dealt with as well within a comparatively short 
period of time. If both higher capital ratios and high investment 
ratios are to be attained, a reallocation of savings and/or a 
change in the investment policy of institutional investors and, 
possibly, the banks is called for. 
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As for a reallocation of savings, it is not improbable that free 
savings will inerease in the future. The share of pension funds and 
life assuranee companies in total household savings has risen to 
such iraposing heights largely because of interest earnings (see 
TabIe 2). Now that interest rates seera set to stay rauch below the 
levels reached around 1980, the share of these investors in savings 
cannot but fall. The other side of the coin is that the interest 
burden for business firras diminishes, so that savings (retained 
earnings) may well inerease above the 1984 level. As for free 
household savings, they were at an historically very low level in 
the recent past. The permanent income hypothesis tells us that 
consumers are apt to keep up their expenditure at the levels they 
were accustomed to, in the face of a fall in income which is 
considered to be only of a temporary nature. If and when income 
growth is resumed, consumer spending is likely to inerease less 
than proportionally. In other words, the free savings ratio is 
likely to inerease under such circumstances. With the prospect of 
higher returns, part of these savings may find their way to company 
shares. The Dutch government provides a little help in this 
direction by exempting devidends to the amount of Dfl. 1000 per 
year, or Dfl. 2000 for couples, from income tax. 
Any problems regarding the overall sufficiency of the supply of 
own funds would disappear at a blow if institutional investors feit 
free to behave like their British and American counterparts. With 
the assets of pension funds totalling Dfl. 256 billion in 1985, a 
gradual redirectlon of their investments toward company shares 
could go a long way toward satisfying the demand backlog for own 
funds, whilst they could easily satisfy a large part of the need 
for additional own funds for net investment purposes out of annual 
accruals. There is some ground for believing that steps in this 
direction will be taken. First of all, the government seems 
determined to further reduce the Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement and secondly, housebuilding activities will if anything 
be further reduced. This will force the institutional investors to 
look for. other outlets for their funds. 
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Gradually they seem to beeome less averse to this idea, even if 
they still seem reluctant to abandon their traditional preference 
for private placements and government debt. Part of their 
investments would of course go, and in fact do go, abroad, but that 
doesn't pose any special problems, as we have seen above. It can be 
argued that it is in the interest of the institutional investors 
themselves to provide Duten business with adequate capital and in 
that way stimulate economie growthl6). Furtherraore, the spirit of 
deregulation may lead the government to loosen its grip on the 
investment policy of the state pension fund. 
This leaves us with one problem, not previously touched upon. Given 
virtually unrestricted international capital flows and provided 
that the free household savings ratio increases and institutional 
investors beeome more interested in company shares, sufficiënt own 
funds can be made available to business enterprises. Big investors, 
however, are only interested in eompany shares for which a large 
seeondary market exists, because they do not want to run the risk 
of getting stuek with illiquid assets. Households may be willing to 
invest in medium-sized national business companies listed on the 
parallel stock exchange in Amsterdam, but this leaves small 
business firms out in the cold. 
There is a consensus that small business eontributes much to 
innovation and to employment creation. With a view to these 
contributions, the government has tried to stimulate the private 
sector to provide venture capital by providing guarantees to 
specialised investment companies and offering additional income tax 
exemptions on dividends from these companies. 
This is in line with developments abroad1?). So far these efforts 
have not met with much success. One causal factor may be that 
minimal participations are at least Dfl. 200,000,-, because of 
management costs. Given that these investment companies are only 
allowed to provide less than 50% of own funds, whilst on the basis 
of own funds a similar amount may be borrowed, the minimum 
investment will be in the region of Dfl. 600,000 to Dfl. 800,000, 
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which may be too high a sum for a number of small, s t a r t ing firms. 
On the part of the investment companies, one hears the complaint 
that there are too few well-thought-out investment plans. For many 
a hard-pressed owner-manager of a small firm, i t would be asking 
too much to require them to draw up such a plan. So on both sides 
of the market there are high t ransact ion cos t s . These have to be 
incurred in order to provide the supplier of cap i ta l with the 
required amount of information..A f i rm's house bank may be bes t -
placed to solve th i s information problem. This leaves us at the 
point where we raust ask whether the time is not r ipe for commercial 
banks themselves to become shareholders in small businesses, and 
not leave the f ield to a f f i l i a t ed investment companies. That would, 
apart from a change in the Law on Banking Supervision, involve as 
much rethinking as a switch in i n s t i t u t i o n a l inves to rs ' investments 
from loans to company shares . I t would also imply that owners-
d i rec tors of small firms must accept no longer to be the sole 
masters, which many of them seem loath to d o ^ ) . But a dynamic 
society demands f lexible i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t seems high time for 
change in habitual modes of thought and action in the f ie ld of 
business finance. 
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